diff --git a/bpl/1962a/1-in/bpl-1962a-letter.txt b/bpl/1962a/1-in/bpl-1962a-letter.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec6f146
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bpl/1962a/1-in/bpl-1962a-letter.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
+
+810 KIEWIT PLAZA
+
+OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
+
+July 6, 1962
+
+A Reminder:
+
+In my letter of January 24, 1962 reporting on 1961, I inserted a section entitled. "And a Prediction." While I
+have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon my readers, nevertheless, a reprinting of that
+section, in its entirety, may be worthwhile:
+
+And a Prediction
+
+Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about
+predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.
+
+I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next
+year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.
+
+I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the
+general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is
+in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any
+great importance for the long-term investor.
+
+Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to
+7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the
+experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market
+probably faces disappointment.
+
+Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much
+about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in
+which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the
+partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have
+watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
+
+It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not
+only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.
+
+For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in
+declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying
+amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we
+can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
+
+Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability
+of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%.
+If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it
+is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this
+over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year over-all gain
+compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.
+
+The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear
+very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am
+completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this
+regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such
+expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but
+fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!
+
+The First Half of 1962:
+
+Between yearend 1961 and June 30, 1962 the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28. If one had owned the Dow
+during this period, dividends of approximately $11.00 would have been received so that overall a loss of 21.7%
+would have been the result of investing in the Dow. For the statistical minded, Appendix A gives the results of
+the Dow by years since formation of the predecessor partnerships.
+
+As stated above, a declining Dow gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage advantages which,
+coupled with only an average performance during advancing markets, will give us quite satisfactory long-term
+results. Our target is an approximately 1/2% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved, means we
+have a considerably more conservative vehicle for investment in stocks than practically any alternative.
+
+As outlined in Appendix B, showing combined predecessor partnership results, during the first half of 1962 we
+had one of the best periods in our history, achieving a minus 7.5% result before payments to partners, compared
+to the minus 21.7% overall result on the Dow. This 14.2 percentage points advantage can be expected to widen
+during the second half if the decline in the general market continues, but will probably narrow should the market
+turn upward. Please keep in mind my continuing admonition that six-months' or even one-year's results are not
+to be taken too seriously. Short periods of measurement exaggerate chance fluctuations in performance. While
+circumstances contributed to an unusually good first half, there are bound to be periods when we do relatively
+poorly. The figures for our performance involve no change in the valuation of our controlling interest in
+Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, although developments in recent months point toward a probable
+higher realization.
+
+Investment Companies during the First Half
+
+Past letters have stressed our belief that the Dow is no pushover as a yardstick for investment performance. To
+the extent that funds are invested in common stocks, whether the manner of investment be through investment
+companies, investment counselors, bank trust departments, or do-it-yourself, our belief is that the overwhelming
+majority will achieve results roughly comparable to the Dow. Our opinion is that the deviations from the Dow
+are much more likely to be toward a poorer performance than a superior one.
+
+To illustrate this point, we have continually measured the Dow and limited partners' results against the two
+largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a program of common stock investment and
+the two largest closed-end investment companies. The tabulation in Appendix C shows the five -years' results,
+and you will note the figures are extraordinarily close to those of the Dow. These companies have total assets of
+about $3.5 billion.
+
+In the interest of getting this letter out promptly, we are mailing it before results are available for the closed-end
+companies. However, the two mutual funds both did poorer than the Dow, with Massachusetts Investors Trust
+having a minus 23% overall performance, and Investors Stock Fund realizing a minus 25.4%. This is not
+unusual as witness the lead article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL of June 13, 1962 headed "Funds vs.
+Market.” Of the 17 large common stock funds studied, everyone had a record poorer than the Dow from the
+peak on the Dow of 734, to the date of the article, although in some cases the margin of inferiority was minor.
+
+Particularly hard hit in the first half were the so-called “growth” funds which, almost without exception, were
+down considerably more than the Dow. The three large "growth" (the quotation marks are more applicable now)
+funds with the best record in the preceding few years, Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund, and
+Wellington Equity Fund averaged an overall minus 32.3% for the first half. It is only fair to point out that
+because of their excellent records in 1959-61, their overall performance to date is still better than average, as it
+may well be in the future. Ironically, however, this earlier superior performance had caused such a rush of new
+investors to come to them that the poor performance this year was experienced by very many more holders than
+enjoyed the excellent performance of earlier years. This experience tends to confirm my hypothesis that
+investment performance must be judged over a period of time with such a period including both advancing and
+declining markets. There will continue to be both; a point perhaps better understood now than six months ago.
+
+In outlining the results of investment companies, I do so not because we operate in a manner comparable to
+them or because our investments are similar to theirs. It is done because such funds represent a public batting
+average of professional, highly-paid investment management handling a very significant $20 billion of
+securities. Such management, I believe, is typical of management handling even larger sums. As an alternative
+to an interest in the partnership, I believe it reasonable to assume that many partners would have investments
+managed similarly.
+
+Asset Values:
+
+The above calculations of results are before allocation to the General Partner and monthly payments to partners.
+Of course, whenever the overall results for the year are not plus 6% on a market value basis (with deficiencies
+carried forward) there is no allocation to the General Partner. Therefore, non-withdrawing partners have had a
+decrease in their market value equity during the first six months of 7.5% and partners who have withdrawn at
+the rate of 6% per annum have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first half of 10.5%. Should
+our results for the year be less than plus 6% (and unless there should be a material advance in the Dow, this is
+very probable) partners receiving monthly payments will have a decrease in their market value equity at
+December 31, 1962. This means that monthly payments at 6% on this new market equity next year will be on a
+proportionately reduced basis. For example, if our results were an overall minus 7% for the year, a partner
+receiving monthly payments who had a market value interest of $100,000 on January 1, 1962 would have an
+equity at December 31, 1962 of $87,000. This reduction would arise from the minus 7% result, or $7, 000 plus
+monthly payments of $500 for an additional $6,000. Thus, with $87,000 of market equity on January 1, 1963,
+monthly payments next year would be $435.00.
+
+None of the above, of course, has any applicability to advance payments received during 1962 which do not
+participate in profits or losses, but earn a straight 6%.
+
+APPENDIX A
+
+DOW-JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE
+
+[TABLE]
+Year & Closing Dow & Change for Year & Dow Dividend Overall & Result from Dow & Percentage Result
+1956 499.47 -- -- -- --
+1957 435.69 -63.78 21.61 -42.17 -8.4%
+1958 583.65 147.96 20.00 167.96 38.5%
+1959 679.36 95.71 20.74 116.45 20.0%
+1960 615.89 63.47 21.36 42.11 -6.2%
+1961 731.14 115.25 22.61 137.86 22.4%
+6/30/62 561.28 169.86 11.00* -158.86 -21.7%
+[/TABLE]
+
+*Estimated
+
+APPENDIX B
+PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE
+
+[TABLE]
+Year & Partnership Result (1) & Limited Partners’ Results (2)
+1957 10.4% 9.3%
+1958 40.9% 32.2%
+1959 25.9% 20.9%
+1960 22.8% 18.6%
+1961 45.9% 35.9%
+6/30/62 -7.5% -7.5%
+[/TABLE]
+
+(1) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire
+year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partners.
+(2) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general
+partner based upon present partnership agreement.
+
+APPENDIX C
+
+YEARLY RESULTS
+
+[TABLE]
+Year & Mass. Inv. Trust (1) & Investors Stock (1) & Lehman (2) & Tri-Cont (2)
+1957 -11.4% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4%
+1958 42.7% 47.5% 40.8% 33.2%
+1959 9.0% 10.3% 8.1% 8.4%
+1960 -1.0% -0.6% 2.5% 2.8%
+1961 25.6% 24.9% 23.6% 22.5%
+6/30/92 23.0% -25.4% N.A. N.A.
+[/TABLE]
+
+(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
+(2) From Moody's Bank & Finance Manual - 1962.
+
+CUMULATIVE RESULTS
+
+[TABLE]
+Years & Mass Inv Trust & Investors Stock & Lehman & Tri-Cont & Dow & Limited Partners
+1957 -11.4% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
+1957-58 26.4% 29.2% 24.7% 30.0% 26.9% 44.5%
+1957-59 37.8% 42.5% 34.8% 40.9% 52.3% 74.7%
+1957-60 36.4% 41.6% 38.2% 44.8% 42.9% 107.2
+1957-61 71.4% 76.9% 70.8% 77.4% 74.9% 181.6
+1957-6/30/62 31.9% 32.0% N.A. N.A. 37.0% 160.5%
+[/TABLE]
+
diff --git a/bpl/1962a/bpl-1962a.mp3 b/bpl/1962a/bpl-1962a.mp3
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b744a42
Binary files /dev/null and b/bpl/1962a/bpl-1962a.mp3 differ
diff --git a/bpl/1962a/inputs-bpl-1962a.txt b/bpl/1962a/inputs-bpl-1962a.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ba4062
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bpl/1962a/inputs-bpl-1962a.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+file 3-wavs/output-000.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-001.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-002.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-003.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-004.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-005.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-006.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-007.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-008.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-009.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-010.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-011.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-012.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-013.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-014.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-015.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-016.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-017.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-018.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-019.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-020.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-021.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-022.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-023.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-024.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-025.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-026.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-027.wav'
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+file 3-wavs/output-029.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-030.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-031.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-032.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-033.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-034.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-035.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-036.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-037.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-038.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-039.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-040.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-041.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-042.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-043.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-044.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-045.wav'
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+file 3-wavs/output-079.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-080.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-081.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-082.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-083.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-084.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-085.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-086.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-087.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-088.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-089.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-090.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-091.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-092.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-093.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-094.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-095.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-096.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-097.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-098.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-099.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-100.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-101.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-102.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-103.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-104.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-105.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-106.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-107.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-108.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-109.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-110.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-111.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-112.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-113.wav'
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+file 3-wavs/output-115.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-116.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-117.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-118.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-119.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-120.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-121.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-122.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-123.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-124.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-125.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-126.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-127.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-128.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-129.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-130.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-131.wav'
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+file 3-wavs/output-133.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-134.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-135.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-136.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-137.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-138.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-139.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-140.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-141.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-142.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-143.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-144.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-145.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-146.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-147.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-148.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-149.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-150.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-151.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-152.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-153.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-154.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-155.wav'
+file 3-wavs/output-156.wav'
diff --git a/process.sh b/process.sh
index d42ceaf..54a0c31 100755
--- a/process.sh
+++ b/process.sh
@@ -18,10 +18,8 @@ check_and_exit()
 rm -f $series/$year/3-wavs/$series-$year.wav
 rm -f $series/$year/$series-$year.wav
 python3 ffmpeg_inputs.py $series/$year "$series-$year"
-check_and_exit()
 
 # ffmpeg -f concat -safe 0 -i $series/$year/inputs-$series-$year.txt -c copy $series/$year/$series-$year.wav
 ffmpeg -i $series/$year/$series-$year.wav $series/$year/$series-$year.mp3
-check_and_exit()
 
 rm -f $series/$year/$series-$year.wav