diff --git a/berkshire-hathaway/1978/1-in/berkshire-hathaway-1978-letter.txt b/berkshire-hathaway/1978/1-in/berkshire-hathaway-1978-letter.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4fbeb6f --- /dev/null +++ b/berkshire-hathaway/1978/1-in/berkshire-hathaway-1978-letter.txt @@ -0,0 +1,549 @@ + + +BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. + + +To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: + + First, a few words about accounting. The merger with +Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. at yearend adds two new +complications in the presentation of our financial results. +After the merger, our ownership of Blue Chip Stamps increased to +approximately 58% and, therefore, the accounts of that company +must be fully consolidated in the Balance Sheet and Statement of +Earnings presentation of Berkshire. In previous reports, our +share of the net earnings only of Blue Chip had been included as +a single item on Berkshire’s Statement of Earnings, and there had +been a similar one-line inclusion on our Balance Sheet of our +share of their net assets. + + This full consolidation of sales, expenses, receivables, +inventories, debt, etc. produces an aggregation of figures from +many diverse businesses - textiles, insurance, candy, newspapers, +trading stamps - with dramatically different economic +characteristics. In some of these your ownership is 100% but, in +those businesses which are owned by Blue Chip but fully +consolidated, your ownership as a Berkshire shareholder is only +58%. (Ownership by others of the balance of these businesses is +accounted for by the large minority interest item on the +liability side of the Balance Sheet.) Such a grouping of Balance +Sheet and Earnings items - some wholly owned, some partly owned - +tends to obscure economic reality more than illuminate it. In +fact, it represents a form of presentation that we never prepare +for internal use during the year and which is of no value to us +in any management activities. + + For that reason, throughout the report we provide much +separate financial information and commentary on the various +segments of the business to help you evaluate Berkshire’s +performance and prospects. Much of this segmented information is +mandated by SEC disclosure rules and covered in “Management’s +Discussion” on pages 29 to 34. And in this letter we try to +present to you a view of our various operating entities from the +same perspective that we view them managerially. + + A second complication arising from the merger is that the +1977 figures shown in this report are different from the 1977 +figures shown in the report we mailed to you last year. +Accounting convention requires that when two entities such as +Diversified and Berkshire are merged, all financial data +subsequently must be presented as if the companies had been +merged at the time they were formed rather than just recently. +So the enclosed financial statements, in effect, pretend that in +1977 (and earlier years) the Diversified-Berkshire merger already +had taken place, even though the actual merger date was December +30, 1978. This shifting base makes comparative commentary +confusing and, from time to time in our narrative report, we will +talk of figures and performance for Berkshire shareholders as +historically reported to you rather than as restated after the +Diversified merger. + + With that preamble it can be stated that, with or without +restated figures, 1978 was a good year. Operating earnings, +exclusive of capital gains, at 19.4% of beginning shareholders’ +investment were within a fraction of our 1972 record. While we +believe it is improper to include capital gains or losses in +evaluating the performance of a single year, they are an +important component of the longer term record. Because of such +gains, Berkshire’s long-term growth in equity per share has been +greater than would be indicated by compounding the returns from +operating earnings that we have reported annually. + + For example, over the last three years - generally a bonanza +period for the insurance industry, our largest profit producer - +Berkshire’s per share net worth virtually has doubled, thereby +compounding at about 25% annually through a combination of good +operating earnings and fairly substantial capital gains. Neither +this 25% equity gain from all sources nor the 19.4% equity gain +from operating earnings in 1978 is sustainable. The insurance +cycle has turned downward in 1979, and it is almost certain that +operating earnings measured by return on equity will fall this +year. However, operating earnings measured in dollars are likely +to increase on the much larger shareholders’ equity now employed +in the business. + + In contrast to this cautious view about near term return +from operations, we are optimistic about prospects for long term +return from major equity investments held by our insurance +companies. We make no attempt to predict how security markets +will behave; successfully forecasting short term stock price +movements is something we think neither we nor anyone else can +do. In the longer run, however, we feel that many of our major +equity holdings are going to be worth considerably more money +than we paid, and that investment gains will add significantly to +the operating returns of the insurance group. + +Sources of Earnings + + To give you a better picture of just where Berkshire’s +earnings are produced, we show below a table which requires a +little explanation. Berkshire owns close to 58% of Blue Chip +which, in addition to 100% ownership of several businesses, owns +80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. Thus, Berkshire’s equity in +Wesco’s earnings is about 46%. In aggregate, businesses that we +control have about 7,000 full-time employees and generate +revenues of over $500 million. + + The table shows the overall earnings of each major operating +category on a pre-tax basis (several of the businesses have low +tax rates because of significant amounts of tax-exempt interest +and dividend income), as well as the share of those earnings +belonging to Berkshire both on a pre-tax and after-tax basis. +Significant capital gains or losses attributable to any of the +businesses are not shown in the operating earnings figure, but +are aggregated on the “Realized Securities Gain” line at the +bottom of the table. Because of various accounting and tax +intricacies, the figures in the table should not be treated as +holy writ, but rather viewed as close approximations of the 1977 +and 1978 earnings contributions of our constituent businesses. + + +[SKIP] + Net Earnings + Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax + -------------------------------------- ------------------ + Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share + ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ +(in thousands of dollars) 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 + -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- +Total - all entities ......... $66,180 $57,089 $54,350 $42,234 $39,242 $30,393 + ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== +Earnings from operations: + Insurance Group: + Underwriting ............. $ 3,001 $ 5,802 $ 3,000 $ 5,802 $ 1,560 $ 3,017 + Net investment income .... 19,705 12,804 19,691 12,804 16,400 11,360 + Berkshire-Waumbec textiles 2,916 (620) 2,916 (620) 1,342 (322) + Associated Retail + Stores, Inc. ............ 2,757 2,775 2,757 2,775 1,176 1,429 + See’s Candies .............. 12,482 12,840 7,013 6,598 3,049 2,974 + Buffalo Evening News ....... (2,913) 751 (1,637) 389 (738) 158 + Blue Chip Stamps - Parent .. 2,133 1,091 1,198 566 1,382 892 + Illinois National Bank + and Trust Company ....... 4,822 3,800 4,710 3,706 4,262 3,288 + Wesco Financial + Corporation - Parent .... 1,771 2,006 777 813 665 419 + Mutual Savings and + Loan Association ........ 10,556 6,779 4,638 2,747 3,042 1,946 + Interest on Debt ........... (5,566) (5,302) (4,546) (4,255) (2,349) (2,129) + Other ...................... 720 165 438 102 261 48 + -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- + Total Earnings from + Operations ............ $52,384 $42,891 $40,955 $31,427 $30,052 $23,080 +Realized Securities Gain ..... 13,796 14,198 13,395 10,807 9,190 7,313 + -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- + Total Earnings ........... $66,180 $57,089 $54,350 $42,234 $39,242 $30,393 + ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== +[/SKIP] + + Blue Chip and Wesco are public companies with reporting +requirements of their own. Later in this report we are +reproducing the narrative reports of the principal executives of +both companies, describing their 1978 operations. Some of the +figures they utilize will not match to the penny the ones we use +in this report, again because of accounting and tax complexities. +But their comments should be helpful to you in understanding the +underlying economic characteristics of these important partly- +owned businesses. A copy of the full annual report of either +company will be mailed to any shareholder of Berkshire upon +request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chips Stamps, 5801 South +Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette +Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado +Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109. + +Textiles + + Earnings of $1.3 million in 1978, while much improved from +1977, still represent a low return on the $17 million of capital +employed in this business. Textile plant and equipment are on +the books for a very small fraction of what it would cost to +replace such equipment today. And, despite the age of the +equipment, much of it is functionally similar to new equipment +being installed by the industry. But despite this “bargain cost” +of fixed assets, capital turnover is relatively low reflecting +required high investment levels in receivables and inventory +compared to sales. Slow capital turnover, coupled with low +profit margins on sales, inevitably produces inadequate returns +on capital. Obvious approaches to improved profit margins +involve differentiation of product, lowered manufacturing costs +through more efficient equipment or better utilization of people, +redirection toward fabrics enjoying stronger market trends, etc. +Our management is diligent in pursuing such objectives. The +problem, of course, is that our competitors are just as +diligently doing the same thing. + + The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how +producers of relatively undifferentiated goods in capital +intensive businesses must earn inadequate returns except under +conditions of tight supply or real shortage. As long as excess +productive capacity exists, prices tend to reflect direct +operating costs rather than capital employed. Such a supply- +excess condition appears likely to prevail most of the time in +the textile industry, and our expectations are for profits of +relatively modest amounts in relation to capital. + + We hope we don’t get into too many more businesses with such +tough economic characteristics. But, as we have stated before: +(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their +communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting +on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been +cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and +(4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to +investment. As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect +that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile +business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital. + +Insurance Underwriting + + The number one contributor to Berkshire’s overall excellent +results in 1978 was the segment of National Indemnity Company’s +insurance operation run by Phil Liesche. On about $90 million of +earned premiums, an underwriting profit of approximately $11 +million was realized, a truly extraordinary achievement even +against the background of excellent industry conditions. Under +Phil’s leadership, with outstanding assistance by Roland Miller +in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, this segment of +National Indemnity (including National Fire and Marine Insurance +Company, which operates as a running mate) had one of its best +years in a long history of performances which, in aggregate, far +outshine those of the industry. Present successes reflect credit +not only upon present managers, but equally upon the business +talents of Jack Ringwalt, founder of National Indemnity, whose +operating philosophy remains etched upon the company. + + Home and Automobile Insurance Company had its best year +since John Seward stepped in and straightened things out in 1975. +Its results are combined in this report with those of Phil +Liesche’s operation under the insurance category entitled +“Specialized Auto and General Liability”. + + Worker’s Compensation was a mixed bag in 1978. In its first +year as a subsidiary, Cypress Insurance Company, managed by Milt +Thornton, turned in outstanding results. The worker’s +compensation line can cause large underwriting losses when rapid +inflation interacts with changing social concepts, but Milt has a +cautious and highly professional staff to cope with these +problems. His performance in 1978 has reinforced our very good +feelings about this purchase. + + Frank DeNardo came with us in the spring of 1978 to +straighten out National Indemnity’s California Worker’s +Compensation business which, up to that point, had been a +disaster. Frank has the experience and intellect needed to +correct the major problems of the Los Angeles office. Our volume +in this department now is running only about 25% of what it was +eighteen months ago, and early indications are that Frank is +making good progress. + + George Young’s reinsurance department continues to produce +very large sums for investment relative to premium volume, and +thus gives us reasonably satisfactory overall results. However, +underwriting results still are not what they should be and can +be. It is very easy to fool yourself regarding underwriting +results in reinsurance (particularly in casualty lines involving +long delays in settlement), and we believe this situation +prevails with many of our competitors. Unfortunately, self- +delusion in company reserving almost always leads to inadequate +industry rate levels. If major factors in the market don’t know +their true costs, the competitive “fall-out” hits all - even +those with adequate cost knowledge. George is quite willing to +reduce volume significantly, if needed, to achieve satisfactory +underwriting, and we have a great deal of confidence in the long +term soundness of this business under his direction. + + The homestate operation was disappointing in 1978. Our +unsatisfactory underwriting, even though partially explained by +an unusual incidence of Midwestern storms, is particularly +worrisome against the backdrop of very favorable industry results +in the conventional lines written by our homestate group. We +have confidence in John Ringwalt’s ability to correct this +situation. The bright spot in the group was the performance of +Kansas Fire and Casualty in its first full year of business. +Under Floyd Taylor, this subsidiary got off to a truly remarkable +start. Of course, it takes at least several years to evaluate +underwriting results, but the early signs are encouraging and +Floyd’s operation achieved the best loss ratio among the +homestate companies in 1978. + + Although some segments were disappointing, overall our +insurance operation had an excellent year. But of course we +should expect a good year when the industry is flying high, as in +1978. It is a virtual certainty that in 1979 the combined ratio +(see definition on page 31) for the industry will move up at +least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a +whole into an underwriting loss position. For example, in the +auto lines - by far the most important area for the industry and +for us - CPI figures indicate rates overall were only 3% higher +in January 1979 than a year ago. But the items that make up loss +costs - auto repair and medical care costs - were up over 9%. +How different than yearend 1976 when rates had advanced over 22% +in the preceding twelve months, but costs were up 8%. + + Margins will remain steady only if rates rise as fast as +costs. This assuredly will not be the case in 1979, and +conditions probably will worsen in 1980. Our present thinking is +that our underwriting performance relative to the industry will +improve somewhat in 1979, but every other insurance management +probably views its relative prospects with similar optimism - +someone is going to be disappointed. Even if we do improve +relative to others, we may well have a higher combined ratio and +lower underwriting profits in 1979 than we achieved last year. + + We continue to look for ways to expand our insurance +operation. But your reaction to this intent should not be +unrestrained joy. Some of our expansion efforts - largely +initiated by your Chairman have been lackluster, others have been +expensive failures. We entered the business in 1967 through +purchase of the segment which Phil Liesche now manages, and it +still remains, by a large margin, the best portion of our +insurance business. It is not easy to buy a good insurance +business, but our experience has been that it is easier to buy +one than create one. However, we will continue to try both +approaches, since the rewards for success in this field can be +exceptional. + +Insurance Investments + + We confess considerable optimism regarding our insurance +equity investments. Of course, our enthusiasm for stocks is not +unconditional. Under some circumstances, common stock +investments by insurers make very little sense. + + We get excited enough to commit a big percentage of +insurance company net worth to equities only when we find (1) +businesses we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term +prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) +priced very attractively. We usually can identify a small number +of potential investments meeting requirements (1), (2) and (3), +but (4) often prevents action. For example, in 1971 our total +common stock position at Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries +amounted to only $10.7 million at cost, and $11.7 million at +market. There were equities of identifiably excellent companies +available - but very few at interesting prices. (An irresistible +footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% +of net funds available in equities - at full prices they couldn’t +buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, +they committed a then record low of 21% to stocks.) + + The past few years have been a different story for us. At +the end of 1975 our insurance subsidiaries held common equities +with a market value exactly equal to cost of $39.3 million. At +the end of 1978 this position had been increased to equities +(including a convertible preferred) with a cost of $129.1 million +and a market value of $216.5 million. During the intervening +three years we also had realized pre-tax gains from common +equities of approximately $24.7 million. Therefore, our overall +unrealized and realized pre-tax gains in equities for the three +year period came to approximately $112 million. During this same +interval the Dow-Jones Industrial Average declined from 852 to +805. It was a marvelous period for the value-oriented equity +buyer. + + We continue to find for our insurance portfolios small +portions of really outstanding businesses that are available, +through the auction pricing mechanism of security markets, at +prices dramatically cheaper than the valuations inferior +businesses command on negotiated sales. + + This program of acquisition of small fractions of businesses +(common stocks) at bargain prices, for which little enthusiasm +exists, contrasts sharply with general corporate acquisition +activity, for which much enthusiasm exists. It seems quite clear +to us that either corporations are making very significant +mistakes in purchasing entire businesses at prices prevailing in +negotiated transactions and takeover bids, or that we eventually +are going to make considerable sums of money buying small +portions of such businesses at the greatly discounted valuations +prevailing in the stock market. (A second footnote: in 1978 +pension managers, a group that logically should maintain the +longest of investment perspectives, put only 9% of net available +funds into equities - breaking the record low figure set in 1974 +and tied in 1977.) + + We are not concerned with whether the market quickly +revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain +prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most +years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of +securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to +prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling +opportunities provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to +levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying. + + Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid +buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about +the business or its price. When we are convinced as to +attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts. + +Equity holdings of our insurance companies with a market value of +over $8 million on December 31, 1978 were as follows: + +No. of +Shares Company Cost Market +---------- ------- ---------- ---------- + (000s omitted) + 246,450 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. ... $ 6,082 $ 8,626 +1,294,308 Government Employees Insurance Company + Common Stock ......................... 4,116 9,060 +1,986,953 Government Employees Insurance Company + Convertible Preferred ................ 19,417 28,314 + 592,650 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .... 4,531 19,039 +1,066,934 Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation 18,085 18,671 + 453,800 Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. .......... 7,534 10,267 + 953,750 SAFECO Corporation ...................... 23,867 26,467 + 934,300 The Washington Post Company ............. 10,628 43,445 + ---------- ---------- + Total ................................... $ 94,260 $163,889 + All Other Holdings ...................... 39,506 57,040 + ---------- ---------- + Total Equities .......................... $133,766 $220,929 + ========== ========== + + In some cases our indirect interest in earning power is +becoming quite substantial. For example, note our holdings of +953,750 shares of SAFECO Corp. SAFECO probably is the best run +large property and casualty insurance company in the United +States. Their underwriting abilities are simply superb, their +loss reserving is conservative, and their investment policies +make great sense. + + SAFECO is a much better insurance operation than our own +(although we believe certain segments of ours are much better +than average), is better than one we could develop and, +similarly, is far better than any in which we might negotiate +purchase of a controlling interest. Yet our purchase of SAFECO +was made at substantially under book value. We paid less than +100 cents on the dollar for the best company in the business, +when far more than 100 cents on the dollar is being paid for +mediocre companies in corporate transactions. And there is no +way to start a new operation - with necessarily uncertain +prospects - at less than 100 cents on the dollar. + + Of course, with a minor interest we do not have the right to +direct or even influence management policies of SAFECO. But why +should we wish to do this? The record would indicate that they +do a better job of managing their operations than we could do +ourselves. While there may be less excitement and prestige in +sitting back and letting others do the work, we think that is all +one loses by accepting a passive participation in excellent +management. Because, quite clearly, if one controlled a company +run as well as SAFECO, the proper policy also would be to sit +back and let management do its job. + + Earnings attributable to the shares of SAFECO owned by +Berkshire at yearend amounted to $6.1 million during 1978, but +only the dividends received (about 18% of earnings) are reflected +in our operating earnings. We believe the balance, although not +reportable, to be just as real in terms of eventual benefit to us +as the amount distributed. In fact, SAFECO’s retained earnings +(or those of other well-run companies if they have opportunities +to employ additional capital advantageously) may well eventually +have a value to shareholders greater than 100 cents on the +dollar. + + We are not at all unhappy when our wholly-owned businesses +retain all of their earnings if they can utilize internally those +funds at attractive rates. Why should we feel differently about +retention of earnings by companies in which we hold small equity +interests, but where the record indicates even better prospects +for profitable employment of capital? (This proposition cuts the +other way, of course, in industries with low capital +requirements, or if management has a record of plowing capital +into projects of low profitability; then earnings should be paid +out or used to repurchase shares - often by far the most +attractive option for capital utilization.) + + The aggregate level of such retained earnings attributable +to our equity interests in fine companies is becoming quite +substantial. It does not enter into our reported operating +earnings, but we feel it well may have equal long-term +significance to our shareholders. Our hope is that conditions +continue to prevail in securities markets which allow our +insurance companies to buy large amounts of underlying earning +power for relatively modest outlays. At some point market +conditions undoubtedly will again preclude such bargain buying +but, in the meantime, we will try to make the most of +opportunities. + +Banking + + Under Gene Abegg and Pete Jeffrey, the Illinois National +Bank and Trust Company in Rockford continues to establish new +records. Last year’s earnings amounted to approximately 2.1% of +average assets, about three times the level averaged by major +banks. In our opinion, this extraordinary level of earnings is +being achieved while maintaining significantly less asset risk +than prevails at most of the larger banks. + + We purchased the Illinois National Bank in March 1969. It +was a first-class operation then, just as it had been ever since +Gene Abegg opened the doors in 1931. Since 1968, consumer time +deposits have quadrupled, net income has tripled and trust +department income has more than doubled, while costs have been +closely controlled. + + Our experience has been that the manager of an already high- +cost operation frequently is uncommonly resourceful in finding +new ways to add to overhead, while the manager of a tightly-run +operation usually continues to find additional methods to curtail +costs, even when his costs are already well below those of his +competitors. No one has demonstrated this latter ability better +than Gene Abegg. + + We are required to divest our bank by December 31, 1980. +The most likely approach is to spin it off to Berkshire +shareholders some time in the second half of 1980. + +Retailing + + Upon merging with Diversified, we acquired 100% ownership of +Associated Retail Stores, Inc., a chain of about 75 popular +priced women’s apparel stores. Associated was launched in +Chicago on March 7, 1931 with one store, $3200, and two +extraordinary partners, Ben Rosner and Leo Simon. After Mr. +Simon’s death, the business was offered to Diversified for cash +in 1967. Ben was to continue running the business - and run it, +he has. + + Associated’s business has not grown, and it consistently has +faced adverse demographic and retailing trends. But Ben’s +combination of merchandising, real estate and cost-containment +skills has produced an outstanding record of profitability, with +returns on capital necessarily employed in the business often in +the 20% after-tax area. + + Ben is now 75 and, like Gene Abegg, 81, at Illinois National +and Louie Vincenti, 73, at Wesco, continues daily to bring an +almost passionately proprietary attitude to the business. This +group of top managers must appear to an outsider to be an +overreaction on our part to an OEO bulletin on age +discrimination. While unorthodox, these relationships have been +exceptionally rewarding, both financially and personally. It is +a real pleasure to work with managers who enjoy coming to work +each morning and, once there, instinctively and unerringly think +like owners. We are associated with some of the very best. + + + Warren E. 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