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BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
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810 KIEWIT PLAZA
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OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
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January 18, 1964
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Our Performance in 1963
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1963 was a good year. It was not a good year because we had an overall gain of $3,637,167 or 38.7% on our
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beginning net assets, pleasant as that experience may be to the pragmatists in our group. Rather it was a good
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year because our performance was substantially better than that of our fundamental yardstick --the Dow-Jones
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Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”). If we had been down 20% and the Dow had been down 30%,
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this letter would still have begun “1963 was a good year.” Regardless of whether we are plus or minus in a
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particular year, if we can maintain a satisfactory edge on the Dow over an extended period of time, our long
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term results will be satisfactory -- financially as well as philosophically.
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To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the
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performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners' results for all
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full years of BPL's and predecessor partnerships' activities:
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Year Overall Results From
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Dow (1)
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Partnership Results
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(2)
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Limited Partners’
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Results (3)
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1957 -8.4% 10.4% 9.3%
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1958 38.5% 40.9% 32.2%
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1959 20.0% 25.9% 20.9%
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1960 -6.2% 22.8% 18.6%
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1961 22.4% 45.9% 35.9%
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1962 -7.6% 13.9% 11.9%
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1963 20.7% 38.7% 30.5%
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(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received
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through ownership of the Dow during that year.
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(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating
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throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the
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general partner.
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(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for
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allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement.
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One wag among the limited partners has suggested I add a fourth column showing the results of the general
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partner --let's just say he, too, has an edge on the Dow.
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The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results based on the preceding table:
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Year Overall Results From
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Dow
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Partnership Results Limited Partners’
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Results
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1957 -8.4% 10.4% 9.3%
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1957 – 58 26.9% 55.6% 44.5%
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1957 – 59 52.3% 95.9% 74.7%
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1957 – 60 42.9% 140.6% 107.2%
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1957 – 61 74.9% 251.0% 181.6%
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1957 – 62 61.6% 299.8% 215.1%
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1957 – 63 95.1% 454.5% 311.2%
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Annual Compounded
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Rate
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10.0% 27.7% 22.3%
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It appears that we have completed seven fat years. With apologies to Joseph we shall attempt to ignore the
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biblical script. (I've never gone overboard for Noah's ideas on diversification either.)
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In a more serious vein, I would like to emphasize that, in my judgment; our 17.7 margin over the Dow shown
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above is unattainable over any long period of time. A ten percentage point advantage would be a very
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satisfactory accomplishment and even a much more modest edge would produce impressive gains as will be
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touched upon later. This view (and it has to be guesswork -- informed or otherwise) carries with it the corollary
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that we must expect prolonged periods of much narrower margins over the Dow as well as at least occasional
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years when our record will be inferior (perhaps substantially so) to the Dow.
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Much of the above sermon is reflected in "The Ground Rules" sent to everyone in November, but it can stand
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repetition.
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Investment Companies
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We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that
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follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-
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end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-
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Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage about $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $25
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billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the vast majority
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or other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
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The purpose or this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index or
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investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands' annual fees
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of over $7 million, and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. The public batting average of this
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highly-paid talent indicates they achieved results slightly less favorable than the Dow.
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Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table.
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However, most partners, as an alternative to their interest in the Partnership would probably have their funds
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invested in media producing results comparable with investment companies, and I, therefore, feel they offer a
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meaningful standard of performance.
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YEARLY RESULTS
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Year Mass. Inv.
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Trust (1)
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Investors
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Stock (1)
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Lehman (2) Tri-Cont.
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(2)
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Dow Limited
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Partners
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1957 -11.4% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
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1958 42.7% 47.5% 40.8% 33.2% 38.5% 32.2%
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1959 9.0% 10.3% 8.1% 8.4% 20.0% 20.9%
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1960 -1.0% -0.6% 2.5% 2.8% -6.2% 18.6%
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1961 25.6% 24.9% 23.6% 22.5% 22.4% 35.9%
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1962 -9.8% -13.4% -14.4% -10.0% -7.6% 11.9%
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1963 20.0% 16.5% 23.8% 19.5% 20.7% 30.5%
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(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
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(2) From 1963 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62; Estimated for 1963.
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COMPOUNDED
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Year Mass. Inv.
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Trust
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Investors
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Stock
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Lehman Tri-Cont. Dow Limited
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Partners
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1957 -11.4% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
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1957 – 58 26.4% 29.2% 24.7% 30.0% 26.9% 44.5%
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1957 – 59 37.8% 42.5% 34.8% 40.9% 52.3% 74.7%
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1957 – 60 36.4% 41.6% 38.2% 44.8% 42.9% 107.2%
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1957 – 61 71.3% 76.9% 70.8% 77.4% 74.9% 181.6%
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1957 – 62 54.5% 53.2% 46.2% 59.7% 61.6% 215.1%
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1957 – 63 85.4% 78.5% 81.0% 90.8% 95.1% 311.2%
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Annual
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Compounded
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Rate
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9.2% 8.6% 8.8% 9.7% 10.0% 22.3%
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The Dow, of course, is an unmanaged index, and it may seem strange to the reader to contemplate the high
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priests of Wall Street striving vainly to surpass or even equal it. However, this is demonstrably the case.
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Moreover, such a failure cannot be rationalized by the assumption that the investment companies et al are
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handling themselves in a more conservative manner than the Dow. As the table above indicates, and as more
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extensive studies bear out, the behavior of common stock portfolio managed by this group, on average, have
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declined in concert with the Dow. By such a test of behavior in declining markets, our own methods of
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operation have proven to be considerably more conservative than the common stock component of the
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investment company or investment advisor group. While this has been true in the past, there obviously can be no
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guarantees about the future.
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The above may seem like rather strong medicine, but it is offered as a factual presentation and in no way as
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criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, the results
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achieved are the only ones attainable. To behave unconventionally within this framework is extremely difficult.
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Therefore, the collective record of such investment media is necessarily tied to the record of corporate America.
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Their merits, except in the unusual case, do not lie in superior results or greater resistance to decline in value.
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Rather, I feel they earn their keep by the ease of handling, the freedom from decision making and the automatic
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diversification they provide, plus, perhaps most important, the insulation afforded from temptation to practice
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patently inferior techniques which seem to entice so many world-be investors.
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The Joys of Compounding
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Now to the pulse-quickening portion of our essay. Last year, in order to drive home the point on compounding, I
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took a pot shot at Queen Isabella and her financial advisors. You will remember they were euchred into such an
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obviously low-compound situation as the discovery of a new hemisphere.
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Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into
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this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s
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Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000
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converted out to about $20,000.
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If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax
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investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That's $1 quadrillion or
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over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household
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about any purchase or paintings qualifying as an investment.
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However, as I pointed out last year, there are other morals to be drawn here. One is the wisdom of living a long
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time. The other impressive factor is the swing produced by relatively small changes in the rate of compound.
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Below are shown the gains from $100,000 compounded at various rates:
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4% 8% 12% 16%
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10 Years $48,024 $115,892 $210,584 $341,143
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20 Years $119,111 $366,094 $864,627 $1,846,060
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30 Years $224,337 $906,260 $2,895,970 $8,484,940
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It is obvious that a variation of merely a few percentage points has an enormous effect on the success of a
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compounding (investment) program. It is also obvious that this effect mushrooms as the period lengthens. If,
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over a meaningful period of time, Buffett Partnership can achieve an edge of even a modest number of
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percentage points over the major investment media, its function will be fulfilled.
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Some of you may be downcast because I have not included in the above table the rate of 22.3% mentioned on
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page 3. This rate, of course, is before income taxes which are paid directly by you --not the Partnership. Even
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excluding this factor, such a calculation would only prove the absurdity of the idea of compounding at very high
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rates -- even with initially modest sums. My opinion is that the Dow is quite unlikely to compound for any
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important length of time at the rate it has during the past seven years and, as mentioned earlier, I believe our
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margin over the Dow cannot be maintained at its level to date. The product of these assumptions would be a
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materially lower average rate of compound for BPL in the future than the rate achieved to date. Injecting a
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minus 30% year (which is going to happen from time to time) into our tabulation of actual results to date, with,
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say, a corresponding minus 40% for the Dow brings both the figures on the Dow and BPL more in line with
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longer range possibilities. As the compounding table above suggests, such a lowered rate can still provide highly
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satisfactory long term investment results.
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Our Method of Operation
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At this point I always develop literary schizophrenia. On the one hand, I know that we have in the audience a
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number of partners to whom details of our business are interesting. We also have a number to whom this whole
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thing is Greek and who undoubtedly wish I would quit writing and get back to work.
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To placate both camps, I am just going to sketch briefly our three categories at this point and those who are
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interested in getting their doctorate can refer to the appendix for extended treatment of examples.
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Our three investment categories are not differentiated by their expected profitability over an extended period of
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time. We are hopeful that they will each, over a ten or fifteen year period, produce something like the ten
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percentage point margin over the Dow that is our goal. However, in a given year they will have violently
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different behavior characteristics, depending primarily on the type of year it turns out to be for the stock market
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generally. Briefly this is how they shape up:
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“Generals” - A category of generally undervalued stocks, determined primarily by quantitative
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standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or
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nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship.
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Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation on the enterprise substantially
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below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again let me emphasize that
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while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good
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management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant
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management or stockholder group. But we demand value. The general group behaves very much in
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sympathy with the Dow and will turn in a big minus result during a year of substantial decline by the
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Dow. Contrarywise, it should be the star performer in a strongly advancing market. Over the years we
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expect it, of course, to achieve a satisfactory margin over the Dow.
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“Workouts” - These are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs,
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mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or "inside
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information" pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait
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until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although
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that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the
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expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative
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government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many
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workouts appear quite small. A friend refers to this as getting the last nickel after the other fellow has
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made the first ninety-five cents. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period
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produces quite decent annual rates of return. This category produces more steady absolute profits from
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year to year than generals do. In years of market decline, it piles up a big edge for us; during bull
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markets, it is a drag on performance. On a long term basis, I expect it to achieve the same sort of margin
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over the Dow attained by generals.
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“Controls” - These are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we
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start off with the purchase of a sizable block or stock, controls develop from the general category. They
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result from situations where a cheap security does nothing price-wise for such an extended period of
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time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company's stock. At that point we are
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probably in a position to assume some degree of, or perhaps complete, control of the company's
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activities; whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our
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assessment of the company’s future and the management's capabilities. The general we have been
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buying the most aggressively in recent months possesses excellent management following policies that
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appear to make very good sense to us. If our continued buying puts us in a controlling position at some
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point in the future, we will probably remain very passive regarding the operation or this business.
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We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal I would
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much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the
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employment of capital you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.
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Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this
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operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is
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determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the marketplace.
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Our willingness and financial ability to assume a controlling position gives us two-way stretch on many
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purchases in our group of generals. If the market changes its opinion for the better, the security will
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advance in price. If it doesn't, we will continue to acquire stock until we can look to the business itself
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rather than the market for vindication of our judgment.
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Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years.
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Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, re-directing the utilization of capital,
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perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be
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measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of
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profit-if it looks at all close, we pass.
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Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior
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is geared more to that of workouts.
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As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among the three categories is largely determined
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by the accident or availability. Therefore, in a minus year for the Dow, whether we are primarily in generals or
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workouts is largely a matter of luck, but it will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow.
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This is one or many reasons why a single year's performance is of minor importance and, good or bad, should
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never be taken too seriously.
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If there is any trend as our assets grow, I would expect it to be toward controls which heretofore have been our
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smallest category. I may be wrong in this expectation - a great deal depends, of course, on the future behavior of
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the market on which your guess is as good as mine (I have none). At this writing, we have a majority of our
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capital in generals, workouts rank second, and controls are third.
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Miscellaneous
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We are starting off the year with net assets of $17,454,900. Our rapid increase in assets always raises the
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question of whether this will result in a dilution of future performance. To date, there is more of a positive than
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inverse correlation between size of the Partnership and its margin over the Dow. This should not be taken
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seriously however. Larger sums may be an advantage at some times and a disadvantage at others. My opinion is
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that our present portfolio could not be improved if our assets were $1 million or $5 million. Our idea inventory
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has always seemed to be 10% ahead of our bank account. If that should change, you can count on hearing from
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me.
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Susie and I have an investment of $2,392,900 in the Partnership. For the first time I had to withdraw funds in
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addition to my monthly payments, but it was a choice of this or disappointing the Internal Revenue Service.
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Susie and I have a few non-marketable (less than 300 holders) securities of nominal size left over from earlier
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years which in aggregate are worth perhaps 1% of our partnership interest. In addition we have one non-
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marketable holding of more material size of a local company purchased in 1960 which we expect to hold
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indefinitely. Aside from this all our eggs are in the BPL basket and they will continue to be. I can't promise
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results but I can promise a common destiny. In addition, that endless stream of relatives of mine consisting of
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my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, four aunts four cousins and
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five nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL directly or indirectly totaling $1,247,190.
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Bill Scott is also in with both feet, having an interest along with his wife or $237,400, the large majority or their
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net worth. Bill has done an excellent job and on several or our more interesting situations going into 1964, he
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has done the majority or the contact work. I have also shoved off on him as much as possible of the
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administrative work so if you need anything done or have any questions, don't hesitate to ask for Bill if I'm not
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around.
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Beth and Donna have kept an increasing work load flowing in an excellent manner. During December and
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January, I am sure they wish they had found employment elsewhere, but they always manage to keep a
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mountain of work ship-shape.
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Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has done their usual excellent job of meeting a tough timetable. We have instructed
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them to conduct two surprise checks a year (rather than one as in past years) on our securities, cash, etc., in the
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future. These are relatively inexpensive, and I think make a good deal of sense in any financial organization.
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Within the next week you will receive:
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(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1963 federal income tax return. This letter
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is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
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(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1963, setting forth the operations and financial
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position of BPL as well as your own capital account.
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(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/64. This is identical with the
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figure developed in the audit.
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(4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreement listing all partners.
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Let me know if anything needs clarifying. As we grow, there is more chance of missing letters, a name skipped
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over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if it appears we might have erred. Our next letter will be about July
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15th summarizing the first half.
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Cordially,
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Warren E. Buffett
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APPENDIX
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TEXAS NATIONAL PETROLEUM
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This situation was a run-of-the-mill workout arising from the number one source of workouts in recent years --
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the sellouts of oil and gas producing companies.
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TNP was a relatively small producer with which I had been vaguely familiar for years.
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Early in 1962 I heard rumors regarding a sellout to Union Oil of California. I never act on such information, but
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in this case it was correct and substantially more money would have been made if we had gone in at the rumor
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stage rather than the announced stage. However, that's somebody else's business, not mine.
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In early April, 1962, the general terms of the deal were announced. TNP had three classes of securities
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outstanding:
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(1) 6 1/2% debentures callable at 104 1/4 which would bear interest until the sale transpired and at that time
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would be called. There were $6.5 million outstanding of which we purchased $264,000 principal
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amount before the sale closed.
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(2) About 3.7 million shares of common stock of which the officers and directors owned about 40%. The
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proxy statement estimated the proceeds from the liquidation would produce $7.42 per share. We
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purchased 64,035 shares during the six months or so between announcement and closing.
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(3) 650,000 warrants to purchase common stock at $3.50 per share. Using the proxy statement estimate of
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$7.42 for the workout on the common resulted in $3.92 as a workout on the warrants. We were able to
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buy 83,200 warrants or about 13% of the entire issue in six months.
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The risk of stockholder disapproval was nil. The deal was negotiated by the controlling stockholders, and the
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price was a good one. Any transaction such as this is subject to title searches, legal opinions, etc., but this risk
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could also be appraised at virtually nil. There were no anti-trust problems. This absence of legal or anti-trust
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problems is not always the case, by any means.
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The only fly in the ointment was the obtaining of the necessary tax ruling. Union Oil was using a standard ABC
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production payment method of financing. The University of Southern California was the production payment
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holder and there was some delay because of their eleemosynary status.
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This posed a new problem for the Internal Revenue Service, but we understood USC was willing to waive this
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status which still left them with a satisfactory profit after they borrowed all the money from a bank. While
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getting this ironed out created delay, it did not threaten the deal.
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When we talked with the company on April 23rd and 24th, their estimate was that the closing would take place
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in August or September. The proxy material was mailed May 9th and stated the sale "will be consummated
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during the summer of 1962 and that within a few months thereafter the greater part of the proceeds will be
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distributed to stockholders in liquidation.” As mentioned earlier, the estimate was $7.42 per share.
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Bill Scott attended the stockholders meeting in Houston on May 29th where it was stated they still expected to
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close on September 1st.
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The following are excerpts from some of the telephone conversations we had with company officials in ensuing
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months:
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On June 18th the secretary stated "Union has been told a favorable IRS ruling has been formulated but
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must be passed on by additional IRS people. Still hoping for ruling in July.”
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On July 24th the president said that he expected the IRS ruling “early next week.”
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On August 13th the treasurer informed us that the TNP, Union Oil, and USC people were all in
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Washington attempting to thrash out a ruling.
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On September 18th the treasurer informed us "No news, although the IRS says the ruling could be ready
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by next week.”
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The estimate on payout was still $7.42.
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The ruling was received in late September, and the sale closed October 31st. Our bonds were called November
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13th. We converted our warrants to common stock shortly thereafter and received payments on the common of
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$3.50 December 14, 1962, $3.90 February 4, 1963, and 15 cent on April 24, 1963. We will probably get another
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4 cent in a year or two. On 147,235 shares (after exercise of warrants) even 4 cent per share is meaningful.
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This illustrates the usual pattern: (1) the deals take longer than originally projected; and (2) the payouts tend to
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average a little better than estimates. With TNP it took a couple of extra months, and we received a couple of
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extra percent.
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The financial results of TNP were as follows:
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(1) On the bonds we invested $260,773 and had an average holding period of slightly under five months.
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We received 6 ½% interest on our money and realized a capital gain of $14,446. This works out to an
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overall rate of return of approximately 20% per annum.
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(2) On the stock and warrants we have realized capital gain of $89,304, and we have stubs presently valued
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at $2,946. From an investment or $146,000 in April, our holdings ran to $731,000 in October. Based on
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the time the money was employed, the rate or return was about 22% per annum.
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In both cases, the return is computed on an all equity investment. I definitely feel some borrowed money is
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warranted against a portfolio of workouts, but feel it is a very dangerous practice against generals.
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We are not presenting TNP as any earth-shaking triumph. We have had workouts which were much better and
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some which were poorer. It is typical of our bread-and-butter type of operation. We attempt to obtain all facts
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possible, continue to keep abreast of developments and evaluate all of this in terms of our experience. We
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certainly don't go into all the deals that come along -- there is considerable variation in their attractiveness.
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When a workout falls through, the resulting market value shrink is substantial. Therefore, you cannot afford
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many errors, although we fully realize we are going to have them occasionally.
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DEMPSTER MILL MFG.
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This situation started as a general in 1956. At that time the stock was selling at $18 with about $72 in book value
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of which $50 per share was in current assets (Cash, receivables and inventory) less all liabilities. Dempster had
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earned good money in the past but was only breaking even currently.
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The qualitative situation was on the negative side (a fairly tough industry and unimpressive management), but
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the figures were extremely attractive. Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps
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70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years. Just why any particular one should do so is hard to
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say at the time of purchase, but the group expectancy is favorable, whether the impetus is from an improved
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industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.
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We continued to buy the stock in small quantities for five years. During most or this period I was a director and
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was becoming consistently less impressed with the earnings prospects under existing management. However, I
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also became more familiar with the assets and operations and my evaluation of the quantitative factors remained
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very favorable.
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By mid-1961 we owned about 30% or Dempster (we had made several tender offers with poor results), but in
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August and September 1961 made, several large purchases at $30.25 per share, which coupled with a
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subsequent tender offer at the same price, brought our holding to over 70%. Our purchases over the previous
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five years had been in the $16-$25 range.
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On assuming control, we elevated the executive vice president to president to see what he would do unfettered
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by the previous policies. The results were unsatisfactory and on April 23, 1962 we hired Harry Bottle as
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president.
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Harry was the perfect man for the job. I have recited his triumphs before and the accompanying comparative
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balance sheets speak louder than any words in demonstrating the re-employment of capital.
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11/30/61 7/31/63 (unaudited)
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Cash $166,000 $89,000
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US Gov’t Securities – at cost $289,000
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Other marketable securities – at
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market (which exceeds cost)
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$2,049,000
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Total Cash and Securities $166,000 $2,436,000
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Accounts receivable (net) $1,040,000 $864,000
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Inventory $4,203,000 $890,000
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Prepaid expenses, etc. $82,000 $12,000
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Current Assets $5,491,000 $4,202,000
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Other Assets $45,000 $62,000
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Net Plant and Equipment $1,383,000 $862,000
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Total Assets $6,919,000 $5,126,000
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Notes Payable $1,230,000
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Other Liability $1,088,000 $274,000
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Total Liabilities $2,318,000 $274,000
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Net worth
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60,146 shs. 11/30/61
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62,146 shs. 7/31/63 $4,601,000 $4,852,000
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Total liabilities and net worth $6,919,000 $5,126,000
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Harry:
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(1) took the inventory from over $4 million (much of it slow moving) to under $1 million reducing carrying
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costs and obsolescence risks tremendously;
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(2) correspondingly freed up capital for marketable security purchases from which we gained over
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$400,000
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(3) cut administration and selling expense from $150,000 to $75,000 per month;
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(4) cut factory overhead burden from $6 to $4.50 per direct labor hour;
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(5) closed the five branches operating unprofitably (leaving us with three good ones) and replaced them
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with more productive distributors;
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(6) cleaned up a headache at an auxiliary factory operation at Columbus, Nebraska;
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(7) eliminated jobbed lines tying up considerable money (which could be used profitably in securities)
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while producing no profits;
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(8) adjusted prices of repair parts, thereby producing an estimated $200,000 additional profit with virtually
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no loss of volume; and most important;
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(9) through these and many other steps, restored the earning capacity to a level commensurate with the
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capital employed.
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In 1963, the heavy corporate taxes we were facing (Harry surprised me by the speed with which he had earned
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up our tax loss carry-forward) coupled with excess liquid funds within the corporation compelled us to either in
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some way de-incorporate or to sell the business.
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We set out to do either one or the other before the end of 1963. De-incorporating had many problems but would
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have, in effect, doubled earnings for our partners and also eliminated the problem of corporate capital gain tax
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on Dempster securities.
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At virtually the last minute, after several earlier deals had fallen through at reasonably advanced stages, a sale of
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assets was made. Although there were a good many wrinkles to the sale, the net effect was to bring
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approximately book value. This, coupled with the gain we have in our portfolio of marketable securities, gives
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us a realization of about $80 per share. Dempster (now named First Beatrice Corp. - we sold the name to the
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new Co.) is down to almost entirely cash and marketable securities now. On BPL's yearend audit, our First
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Beatrice holdings were valued at asset value (with securities at market) less a $200,000 reserve for various
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contingencies.
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I might mention that we think the buyers will do very well with Dempster. They impress us as people of ability
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and they have sound plans to expand the business and its profitability. We would have been quite happy to
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operate Dempster on an unincorporated basis, but we are also quite happy to sell it for a reasonable price. Our
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business is making excellent purchases -- not making extraordinary sales.
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Harry works the same way I do -- he likes big carrots. He is presently a limited partner of BPL, and the next
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belt-tightening operation we have, he's our man.
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The Dempster saga points up several morals:
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(1) Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour
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stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy.
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It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, why we are
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buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We
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suggest three years as a minimum.
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(2) We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never
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improve our results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone,
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including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th
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Amendment.”
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